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Philo’s De migratione Abrahami: The Soul’s Journey of
Self-Knowledge as Criticism of Stoic oikeiôsis
Summary
This paper considers Philo of Alexandria’s interpretation of Abraham’s journey from Chal-
daea to Palestine, foregrounding Philo’s use of the journey as a metaphor to criticize the
Stoic theory of oikeiôsis. The journey is a metaphor that helps Philo to advance his views
about self-knowledge as an alternative to this Stoic theory of moral progress. In this implicit
polemic, Philo suggests that the Stoic theory guides us in the wrong direction, remains too
immanentist, and posits an end state to a process that has no end.
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In diesem Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass die Interpretation der Reise des Abraham von
Chaldaea nach Palästina im Werk Philons von Alexandrien implizit eine Kritik der stoi-
schen Oikeiôsislehre darstellt. Das Bild der Reise ermöglicht es Philon, seine Vorstellungen
über Selbsterkenntnis als Alternative zur stoischen Theorie der ethischen Entwicklung zu
formulieren. Durch seine implizite Auseinandersetzung legt Philon nahe, dass die stoische
Theorie sich in eine falsche Richtung entwickelt hat; zu immanent bleibt; und einen End-
zustand eines Prozesses annimmt, der kein Ende haben kann.
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The metaphor of a journey can play many different philosophical roles including, as
this paper aims to show, that of criticism. In his treatise De migratione Abrahami, Philo
of Alexandria interprets the biblical account of Abraham’s journey from Chaldaea to
Palestine as an allegorical description of the soul’s development from attachment to
the body and the sensible world, to a grasp of the transcendent deity.1 An important
aspect of Philo’s interpretation is that he sees the soul’s development as a process of
getting to know oneself. This is remarkable considering that Genesis 12.1–6, the text of
which Philo’s treatise offers an exegesis, does not speak of self-knowledge. Why then does
Philo choose to talk about self-knowledge in this context? First, because he thinks self-
knowledge is an important part of what a soul must acquire to improve itself. Second,
and this is what I hope to establish in this paper, the image of the journey, as described
in this Genesis passage, offers Philo a useful vehicle to present his Platonizing ideas about
self-knowledge as a criticism of the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis (‘familiarization’).
While there is much in Stoicism with which Philo agrees, he decidedly rejects their
materialism, pantheism, and the positive view of nature in their ethics.2 This rejection
also shows in Philo’s criticism of oikeiôsis, which is the theory the Stoics offer to account
for moral development. Interestingly, Philo never makes his engagement with this the-
ory explicit.3 The metaphor of the journey is used as a useful vehicle for Philo to develop
this criticism because it allows him to show, without having to say it explicitly, that the
theory of oikeiôsis has been developed in the wrong direction, that true growth needs to
surpass the boundaries that oikeiôsis sets us, and that self-knowledge is never achieved,
only striven for.
1 Philo’s concern is primarily exegetical: he believes
that Scripture contains the highest wisdom and
philosophical truth and tries to bring this out as
much as he can. In his case, this has the remarkable
implication that interpretations of different passages
need not necessarily be philosophically consistent
with one another. Moreover, events or people men-
tioned in the Bible do not necessarily receive the
same interpretation in different treatises. For this
reason, one ought to be very careful in explaining
one Philonic text by means of another. In this paper
I have, therefore, kept references to other works of
Philo to a minimum, including references to texts
that are close to De migratione (Migr.), such as De
Abrahamo (Abr.) 62–80 and De somniis (Somn.) 1.41–
67: there are many parallels between these texts,
but since Philo’s concern in the other two texts is
a different one, such parallels function within a
different interpretative whole. (My references to
Philo’s works follow the standard abbreviations of
the Studia Philonica Annual.) On the issue of Philo’s
‘contrainte exégétique’ and the relative nature of his
thought (relative to a particular text of Scripture),
see the emphatic position of Nikiprowetzky 1977,
esp. 236–242. – Related to the theme of the journey
is that of ﬂight and exile, on which see Runia 2009.
2 See Hadas-Lebel 2003, 271–274, for a brief overview
of Philo’s attitude towards Stoicism (which empha-
sizes the continuities between Philo and the Stoics).
For an inventory of passages in which Philo uses Pla-
tonic and Stoic ideas on the soul see Reydams-Schils
2008. For a corrective of the common view that
Philo adheres to Stoicism on the issue of the pas-
sions see Lévy 2009, 156–161. Long 2008 urges cau-
tion about using Philo as evidence for Stoic views
on physics.
3 He does not do so anywhere in his writings: see the
important study of Lévy 1998 as well as Lévy 2009,
146–148.
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In what follows, I will ﬁrst brieﬂy introduce three stages of self-knowledge that Philo
distinguishes. I will review the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis in section two, and provide ev-
idence that Philo engages with this theory in section three. Sections four, ﬁve, and six
discuss the three stages of self-knowledge in more detail in order to tease out the sub-
stance of Philo’s criticism of the Stoics.
1 Philo’s three stages of self-knowledge
From the various statements that Philo makes about self-knowledge in De migratione, it
is possible, with some simpliﬁcation, to distinguish three stages: ignorance, study of the
senses, and the move towards knowledge of god.4 There are some passages that compli-
cate the picture, which I will discuss later. The ﬁrst stage is that of the natural philoso-
phers, which Philo associates with the Chaldaeans. It is a state of complete ignorance
of oneself combined with the illusion that one has knowledge about the universe and
about phenomena contained within it. The call to self-knowledge is meant to pull peo-
ple away from this state and into the next stage of self-knowledge. The second stage of
self-knowledge is the study of the body and the senses, which should lead to a discov-
ery of the worth of the intellect. Philo locates it in Haran, the place where Abraham
(and his father Terah) lived for a while. It is associated with the realisation that one lacks
knowledge about many things, and that one would do best ﬁrst to get to know oneself.
In the ﬁnal stage, self-knowledge is tied up with knowledge of god. It remains unclear,
here as elsewhere in Philo, to what extent one can really have knowledge of god.5 This
third stage really consists in a transition from the previous form of self-knowledge. Philo
mentions the idea that self-knowledge allows us to know god as the cause of everything,
an ability that arises by analogy from our acquaintance with our intellect, which is the
cause with respect to the rest of our soul and body. At other moments, Philo retracts
such epistemic conﬁdence.
4 These are based on the treatise as a whole, as dis-
cussed in this paper, but particularly the three stages
Philo himself distinguishes in 194–195. Nazzaro
1969 proposed an alternative triad: self-knowledge
as (i) an antidote to presumption, (ii) an aware-
ness of human insigniﬁcance, and (iii) a route to
knowing god. I choose to deviate from this in par-
ticular because it contains signiﬁcant overlap be-
tween its second and third stages (and between all
stages in Nazzaro’s discussion). Cf. also Courcelle
1974, whose brief but sagacious treatment signals
key themes in Philo’s corpus as a whole (39–43).
5 On this matter see among other publications Früch-
tel 1968, 147–163; and Runia 2002, especially 299–
303, where he offers an analysis of Spec. 1.32–50 and
Praem. 36–46. Mackie 2009 offers a careful account
of Philo’s statements about the possibility of seeing
god, drawing out both the variance among the ideas
found and the factors that may affect their presence
(audience, focus of the exegesis, and spiritual ad-
vancement of the ‘seer’).
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As we will explore below, Philo presents his thoughts on self-knowledge as part of an
alternative view of moral development to the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis. However, the three
stages of self-knowledge also relate to Plato’s philosophical writings. In ways which I will
discuss in sections four and ﬁve, Philo integrates disparate elements that he ﬁnds in the
Platonic corpus, especially in the Phaedrus and in the Alcibiades I. In the Phaedrus, Socrates
famously comments that he cannot evaluate the truth of exegeses of the Boreas myth in
naturalistic terms because he has not yet come to know himself. This move of epistemic
modesty is clearly echoed in Philo’s ﬁrst stage. In the Alcibiades I, Socrates claims that
self-knowledge is knowledge of oneself as a soul. He also, somewhat later, claims that
one can know oneself most of all after having come to know everything divine. These
comments are related to Philo’s second and third stages. Philo’s use of these Platonic
texts makes clear that he conceives of his criticism of the Stoics as a Platonic criticism.
Moreover, they also serve a more speciﬁc polemical purpose: like the Platonists, the
Stoics also looked to Socrates as a moral example, and the Phaedrus and Alcibiades I are
exactly the kind of texts that provided them with an understanding of Socrates.6 Before
we explore Philo’s thoughts on self-knowledge and their Platonic background further,
however, let us remind ourselves of the broad outlines of the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis and
the way it extends into the Stoic view of our place in the cosmos.
2 Stoic oikeiôsis and cosmo-theology
The classic account of oikeiôsis is given in Diogenes Laertius. The amount of references to
Stoic texts that Diogenes provides inspires conﬁdence that his account presents a more
reliably Stoic version of the theory than some other accounts.7
They [the Stoics] say that an animal has self-preservation as the object of its
ﬁrst impulse, since nature from the beginning appropriates it (oikeiousês), as
Chrysippus says in hisOn ends book 1. The ﬁrst thing appropriate (prôton oikeion)
to every animal, he says, is its own constitution and the consciousness of this. …
This is why the animal rejects what is harmful and accepts what is appropriate
(oikeion). …
And since reason, by way of a more perfect management [than in the case of
animal impulse], has been bestowed on rational beings, to live correctly in ac-
cordance with reason comes to be natural for them. … Therefore Zeno … was
6 On Stoic use of the Phdr. as a Socratic text see
Brouwer 2014. For the Alcibiades I compare Cic.,
Tusc. 1.52; Epict. Diss. 3.1.
7 Notably that of Cicero’s character Cato in Fini. 3.16–
25, which could be orthodox but may well contain
Peripatetic thought too: see Schmitz 2014 for an
argument to that effect.
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the ﬁrst to say that living in agreement with nature is the end, which is living
in accordance with virtue. … Further, living in accordance with virtue is equiv-
alent to living in accordance with experience of what happens by nature, as
Chrysippus says[.]8
The key factors in this account are: a) nature; b) the process of ‘familiarization’, oikeioô; c)
constitution; and d) reason. Let us brieﬂy review the theory by looking at each of these.
(a) The theory operates within a framework of naturalism. Nature takes care of its
creatures by giving them the impulse to preserve themselves, and as such, the affective
motivation to pursue that which helps them prosper and avoid that which threatens
their existence. The Stoics provide an argument for this conclusion that means to show
the absurdity of two alternative possibilities: that nature would alienate creatures from
themselves or that it would leave them indifferent to themselves. The only way for na-
ture’s creative action not to be in vain, according to this argument, is if nature also
subsequently gives its creatures the impulse to persist, and this happens when creatures
identify with themselves.9
(b) What nature does is to familiarize (oikeioô) a creature with things in its envi-
ronment. The verb oikeioô unites different meanings that all play a role in this theory
(and I have used several in the last paragraph).10 Oikeios can mean ‘one’s own’, and it
is this sense of identiﬁcation (and of possession in a derivative way) that plays a major
role in the initial stages of oikeiôsis described by Diogenes above, as well as in the ul-
timate stages of identifying with the rationality of nature and other rational agents. A
related but different sense is ‘intimate’, an affective sense that is prominent when Stoics
talk about the care taken in choosing what promotes one’s life and repelling that which
harms it. Common too is the sense ‘akin’, to which the description of the social com-
ponent of oikeiôsis makes an appeal: we can imagine other human beings as located in
ever wider concentric circles, centred around ourselves, which we are able to draw in,
so that those in distant circles come to seem like close kin.11 In this way, we come to
assume a moral stance in which we treat other people’s interests as our own, or in any
case as equal in importance to our own.12 All these meanings, hard to reproduce in any
8 Diog. Laert. 7.85–87; tr. Long and Sedley 1987.
9 On this argument see Inwood 2016. Philo himself
expresses similar ideas in other works, when speak-
ing about divine providence: see Opif. 10; Praem. 42;
Spec. leg. 3.189; Prov. 1.26.
10 On the word and the Stoics’ use of it see especially
Kerferd 1972; Görgemanns 1983, 181–187.
11 The core text here is from Hierocles, preserved in
Stobaeus 4.671.7–673.11 (text 57G in the collec-
tion of Long and Sedley 1987). For discussion see
Inwood 1984; Konstan 2016.
12 Opinions differ on whether this stance should be
described as one of impartiality (e.g. Annas 1993,
159–179, 262–276) or as identiﬁcation (e.g. Algra
2003). The more ‘social’ aspect of oikeiôsis has some-
times been regarded as different from the initial,
personal oikeiôsis. See Annas 1993, 265; Inwood
1983; cf. Inwood 1985, esp. 184–194; Inwood 1999.
See also Engberg-Pedersen 1986. Lee 2002 and Algra
2003 persuasively argue for the unity of the theory.
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particular modern translation, should be kept in mind when we interpret ancient texts
about oikeiôsis.
(c) It is worth noting that when they describe the object to which one is familiarized,
the Stoics do not simply speak of self-love, but of animals’ identiﬁcation or affinity with
their constitution. It is the structure of one’s being. Hence the emphasis we encounter
in many Stoic accounts on the different kinds of beings that exist. In the account in
Diogenes Laertius, we get a description divided into plants, animals, and reason (I have
included only the latter in the citation above). Animals are distinguished from plants
because they have impulses, which are necessary for them to reach for and move towards
food that does not come to them of its own accord. This impulse is the leading aspect of
their soul and, therefore, an important element in the constitution to which an animal
feels oikeios (a plant has no oikeiôsis to impulse). Since this impulse to be oikeios with
something (and act on it) comes from nature, it is the natural thing to do for an animal
to live by its impulse. (In other texts the description is extended to particular kinds of
animals, with their typical impulses towards and away from e.g. speciﬁc other animals
like predators or prey.)13 Human beings also start out in this way (children in fact have a
constitution that is very comparable to that of animals).14 As reason develops, however,
human beings start to notice rational patterns: in the actions they naturally perform
and in the workings of nature. When moral development is not stilted, a human being
comes to act from a different motivation than before; it acts, not because it has partic-
ular impulses to do and avoid certain sets of things, but because acting on such natural
impulses is the reasonable thing to do. They come, in other words, to understand them-
selves as rational beings. For them, reason has become paramount in their constitution,
and it is to reason above all that they sense themselves to be oikeios. Living rationally,
therefore, becomes the natural life for human beings.
(d) In one sense, then, the reasonable life for human beings is a life lived in accor-
dance with the reason (logos) that they sense themselves to have or be. The Stoic theory
is not, however, a subjectivist theory in which virtuous agents follow the decrees of their
own particular reason. The human faculty of reason is essentially the same as the reason
that pervades the universe.15 A virtuous life can, therefore, also be described as a life
lived in accordance with the commands of Zeus, the name the Stoics use to refer to cos-
mic rationality. Indeed, it is a major component of a rational being’s understanding of
its own constitution that it understands itself as of a piece with God. The fundamental
13 Particularly in Hierocles, Elements of Ethics II.19–
III.54 (Bastianini and Long 1992); Sen. Ep. 121 (on
this letter see Bees 2004, 16–45).
14 The focus on children in this kind of argument
(there are comparable ones in the Epicurean tradi-
tion) has earned them the name ‘cradle argument’,
coined in Brunschwig 1986.
15 For the debate about subjectivist readings of oikeiôsis
(usually taking their bearings from Cicero’s account
in Fin. 3) cf. among others Engberg-Pedersen 1986;
Lee 2002.
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importance of this cosmic sense of reason also comes to the fore in the last sentence of
the citation above, where Chrysippus ﬁne-tunes Zeno’s slogan that the best life is a life
lived according to nature: it is speciﬁcally a life lived in accordance with the experience
of what happens naturally. For Chrysippus, then, the rational life is a natural life in two
senses: it is natural because nature produced the mechanism by which a human being
comes to identify with their rational constitution and because living rationally involves
an actual understanding of (and compliance with) the ways and means of the nature of
the whole.
It turns out, then, that the theory of oikeiôsisﬂows smoothly into a cosmo-theology.16
Stoic perfection consists fundamentally in regarding rationality, as expressed in the cos-
mos and in other rational beings, as one’s own. At the same time, the Stoic sage is
also very much situated in a particular environment, for which she takes responsibil-
ity. As studies in the last decades have shown, rationality requires social involvement
and proper care for the body.17 When the Roman Stoic Seneca addresses this theory
in his letter 121, he even speaks of different constitutions that he says belong to differ-
ent phases of a human life. These two perspectives – one socially embedded, the other
cosmic-rational – may lead to theoretical tensions, but they are both central to Stoic
ethics.
When we turn to Philo, it is worth stressing two aspects of the Stoic theory. First,
there is a great deal of continuity here with the thinking of other ancient schools, par-
ticularly the Peripatetics and the Platonists. The differences should not be exaggerated,
even if ancient polemic might suggest this. Second, the Stoic theory posits a funda-
mental continuity between nature and perfection. In terms of the metaphor of oikeiôsis,
Stoic moral development is at bottom a process of coming to be (and feel) at home in
the world; this is very different for Philo.
3 Philo targets oikeiôsis
Philo does not speak explicitly of ‘oikeiôsis’.18 It is nevertheless plausible that he has this
theory in view when we consider his use of related words: the root oikos (house) and
the opposite term allotriôsis (‘alienation’). Philo ﬁnds reason to speak of one’s oikos in
16 See especially Lee 2002 for the profound connec-
tions between oikeiôsis and Stoic cosmo-theology.
17 See especially Reydams-Schils 2005; Graver 2007.
18 With one exception in a different context: in
47, Philo speaks of the theoretical life being
oikeioumenos (appropriate) to a rational being. Else-
where in Philo, the term oikeiôsis and derivatives oc-
cur occasionally. For a markedly polemical use of it
(and of allotriôsis) see Post. 135; Gig. 28–29; Conf. 82.
As Lévy 1998 shows, Philo uses the term to describe
the kinship between the mind and the divine, rather
than the Stoic process, in an attempt to play down
the signiﬁcance of the Stoic theory: cf. Radice 2008,
142–143; Bonazzi 2008, 246–250.
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the text of Genesis 12.1 itself: “And the Lord said unto Abraham, Depart out of your
land (gê), and out of your kindred (sungeneia), and out of your father’s house (oikos).”
(Migr. 1)19 Of course, the presence of the word ‘house’ in a text does not immediately
make it a response to oikeiôsis; but Philo uses the word in a speciﬁc way. He uses oikos
to mean embodied existence and the human constitution in general, the very condition
to which the Stoics say human beings have oikeiôsis. Initially, it is true, Philo interprets
land, kindred, and paternal home – the three things which the text says Abraham should
leave – as the body, the sense, and speech, respectively (paragraphs 2–6).20 In this initial
division, leaving the oikos is interpreted as a separation from the traps of rhetoric and
language (12).21 I shall return to this initial use of the word below. Elsewhere in the text,
however, Philo employs a broader understanding of oikos, in the description of what I
have called the second stage of self-knowledge. One should study one’s own oikos, Philo
says repeatedly when refering to this second stage. In 185, for instance, which is part of
a speech that Moses is imagined to have addressed to the Chaldaeans, we read:
Explore yourselves only and your own nature, and make your abode (oikêsantes)
with yourselves and not elsewhere: … observing the conditions prevailing in
your own individual household (kata ton idion oikon), the element that is master
in it and that which is in subjection, the living and the lifeless element, the
rational and the irrational, the immortal and the mortal, the better and the
worse.
This conception of what counts as one’s oikos includes the whole of human nature; in
terms of the threefold division from the beginning of the text, it includes the body and
the senses. The body is termed the oikos of the soul in 93. In 187, sense perception is
described as the oikos of thought (dianoia). In 189, the study of the various sense organs
and their functioning is called the investigation of one’s individual oikos. In 195, Philo
makes this identiﬁcation with the three initial factors explicit, when speaking about the
mind’s “study of the features of its own abode (idios oikos), those that concern the body,
sense-perception and speech”.
The things Philo mentions in these various descriptions are the very things about
which one can have self-awareness according to the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis. They are
what make up the human constitution. When he exhorts his readers and the Chaldaeans
to study their own oikos, then, he calls on them to perform an exercise of self-study that
his readers will have recognised as very similar to the initial stages of Stoic oikeiôsis.
19 Here, and throughout the paper, I use the transla-
tion of Colson and Whitaker 1932, slightly modern-
ized and with occasional modiﬁcations.
20 Philo calls the third item ho kata prophoran logos (2,
12), using a Stoic term.
21 Philo emphasizes the secondary importance of lan-
guage by describing it in Platonic terms as only an
imitation of the nature of things (12).
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What Philo propagates is not Stoic oikeiôsis, however. As I mentioned previously, it
is conspicuous that he avoids the Stoics’ own term of art, oikeiôsis, and any form of the
verb oikeioô. This already signals his polemical intent.22 Nor is the description above in
185 completely compatible with Stoic self-study: the strong dualism in the passage and
the reference to immortality establish a distance from Stoic views.
A second aspect of Philo’s treatment of the word oikos that makes an engagement
with Stoic oikeiôsis plausible is the fact that he connects embodied existence with one’s
home, as the Stoics would do, rather than with some kind of exile. The latter option
was certainly open to Philo: he makes this exact move in other treatises,23 echoing the
thought in Plato’s Timaeus that the mind is a heavenly, not an earthly plant (90a4–7). It
is, therefore, a choice on Philo’s part that in De migratione he describes existence in the
body and on this earth as home.
This brings us to the other term that establishes a link between De migratione and
Stoic oikeiôsis plausible: allotriôsis, the opposite of oikeiôsis. It comes at a prominent mo-
ment in the text, when Philo turns to the meaning of the word ‘depart’ (apelthe). He
has identiﬁed the domains from which one should depart as the body, the senses, and
speech. What does it mean to depart from them, however? Philo starts with a warning
reminiscent of Plato’s Phaedo: this is not a call to pursue a real separation, for such a
separation ‘in being’ (kata tên ousian) would mean death. It is rather a call to acquire a
mental distance from them. The decisive word here is allotriôthêti:
The words ‘Depart out of these’ are not equivalent to ‘Sever yourself from them
absolutely,’ since to issue such a command as that would be to prescribe death.
No, the words import ‘Make yourself a stranger to them in judgement and
purpose’ (tên gnômên allotriôthêti).24
Philo’s choice of words is precise; through them he reminds his readers of Stoic oikeiôsis
and makes clear that his moral ideal diverges from the Stoics’ moral ideal. He exhorts
his readers to de-familiarize themselves from their human constitution.
Terminology that reminds us of oikeiôsis recurs a little further on, when Philo dis-
cusses what it means speciﬁcally to depart from the senses. The mind, he says, has be-
come someone else’s property (allotrion agathon) in its attachment to the senses and has
cast off what is its own (idion) (10). It should stop letting itself be alienated (allotriôsas)
22 Cf. the remarks about the whole of Philo’s œuvre in
Lévy 1998, 156.
23 Philo, in places, treats Abraham’s journey itself as
a kind of exile. See for instance Her. 82: ἀποδημίαν
ἡγούμενον ὅλον τὸν μετὰ σώματος βίον, ὁπότε δὲ
δύναιτο τῇ ψυχῇ μόνῃ ζῆν, ἐν πατρίδι καταμένειν
ὑπολαμβάνοντα; Conf. 82; Somn. 1.45. Philo cites
the passage from Tim. in Plant. 17 (I am grateful to




and ﬁnally enjoy its own goods (ouk othneiôn all’ oikeiôn agathôn) (11). In another vari-
ation, Philo expresses the mental distance one should maintain from speech as living
separately from it (dioikizomenon, 12). So we see that Philo avoids strict oikeiôsis termi-
nology but uses words that are very similar to it, including its direct opposite. Moreover,
Philo urges the mind to estrange itself from the common objects of Stoic oikeiôsis; the
way to reclaim that which is its own is by withdrawing from bodily existence.
4 The ﬁrst station
Referencing Philo’s vocabulary has already shown us something of his polemical treat-
ment of oikeiôsis. In order to see how Philo’s criticism plays out in more detail, let us
consider the three phases of self-knowledge in turn. Philo starts his treatise by talking
about a departure from the body, the senses, and speech. In terms of the journey of the
rational soul (represented by Abraham), however, the beginning is to be found some-
where else, in an attitude that Philo associates with the Chaldaeans. A number of dif-
ferent qualiﬁcations come together in Philo’s descriptions of the Chaldaeans. They are
astrologers, students of the stars and people who “walk on” and “talk air”,25 who claim
to know the causes of each and every natural phenomenon, who think that good and
bad result from particular stellar constellations, who emphasize the unity and harmony
of the cosmos, who regard fate as a divinity, and who identify the cosmos with god.26
The Chaldaeans of Philo’s text are commonly associated with the Stoics.27 A num-
ber of Stoic positions support this connection. First, we saw that the Stoics identify
the cosmic order with god and regard heavenly bodies, such as the stars, as gods. Sec-
ond, they regard fate as identical with this god. Third, they think that moral perfection
consists in a type of knowledge; we saw that Diogenes Laertius reports Chrysippus as
describing the moral end as “living in accordance with experience of the actual course
25 Aitherobateîte (184), aeromytheîte (138) – the latter is
an extremely rare word: this is the only occurrence
in the corpus of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, with
only four cognate forms (one of which is aeromythos
in Philo’s De sacr. 32). Both words are reminiscent
of the word aerobateô – the charge that Socrates
cloudwalked was levelled at him in Aristophanes’
Clouds (225, cf. 1503; cf. Pl. Ap. 19c4) and in 184
Philo speaks of the Chaldaeans ﬂoating in the air,
clearly alluding to the Clouds. Philo redirects the
accusation: he has a use for Socrates in his call for
self-knowledge and sees the Stoics as the cloudwalk-
ers / air talkers. (Pace Nazzaro 1969, 68 n. 75, who
denies any link with Aristophanes for the reason
that Philo uses it “mai parodistico”.) The variation
aeromytheîte is likely an allusion to Phdr. 229d–230a,
cited below. Cf. ti huper nephelas pêdâis?; in Somn.
1.54 and meteôroleschôn in Somn. 1.54 and 1.161.
26 Philo describes the Chaldaeans in 136, 138, 178–
179, 184, 187, 194. He also presents Abraham as
formerly being a Chaldaean. For discussion of the
Chaldaeans in other Philonic works see the refer-
ences in Borgen 1997, 217; Wong 1992.
27 Though rarely identiﬁed with them. See among
others the discussion in Beckaert 1961, 28 n. 1; Ru-
nia 2002, 290 cautions against identiﬁcation (cf.
Sandelin 1991, 132–133).
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of nature”.28 Fourth, as treatises like Seneca’s Naturales Quaestiones demonstrate, the Sto-
ics put this conviction into practice by engaging in considerable detail with the study
of natural philosophy.29 Not all characteristics Philo ascribes to the Chaldaeans, how-
ever, are apposite descriptions of the Stoics. While the Stoics allocated an important role
to the mantic art, it would be a misrepresentation to say that they thought that good
and bad follow from particular stellar constellations. The idea that the Chaldaeans are
astrologers also seems to have more to do with traditional ideas about the Chaldaeans
than any speciﬁc Stoic convictions. To some extent, then, Philo’s Chaldaeans are a mix-
ture. They are, nevertheless, a useful textual instrument for Philo to criticize the Stoics.
Philo uses Platonic/Socratic weapons to develop this criticism. He and his Moses
call the Chaldaeans back, down from heaven, towards themselves. He considers them
and their claim to know the causes of everything as epistemically arrogant. What they
should ﬁrst do, Philo urges, is to study themselves. This is a call to a Socratic condition.
As he puts it in 134, once the Chaldaeans engage in a serious study of themselves, they
will discover that they did not know what they thought they knew. Indeed, the highest
a human being will ever reach is an awareness of ignorance (more on this below, in sec-
tion 6). Not only the condition is Socratic, but so is the very move. In Plato’s Phaedrus,
Socrates is asked what he thinks of naturalistic explanations of myths; the myth in ques-
tion is about Boreas’ abduction of a nymph, which some might explain as the North
Wind’s blowing a girl off a rock. Socrates responds:
I have no time for such things; and the reason, my friend, is this. I am still
unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems
to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that. This
is why I do not concern myself with them. I accept what is generally believed,
and, as I was just saying, I look not into them but into my own self[.]30
Socrates’ direct concern in this passage is with demythologizing explanations, as they
were apparently propagated by some sophists. The scope of his remarks, however, is
broader, and they were interpreted in broader terms in antiquity. Socrates’ stance here
signals a turning away from natural philosophy to the study of oneself.31 Philo appro-
priates Socrates’ exhortation and addresses it to the Chaldaeans, thereby presenting a
28 ζῆν κατ᾽ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων, Diog.
Lart. 7.87; also Stobaeus 2.76.8.
29 For Stoic engagement with astronomy and astrology
see Jones 2003, esp. 331–342.
30 Phdr. (229e4–230a3); tr. Nehamas/Woodruff.
31 Behind this broader interpretation of Phdr. 229e4–
230a3, we may also detect the inﬂuence of the Apolo-
gy’s contrast between Socrates’ behavior and that of
the natural philosophers (18a7–19d7) and the so-
called autobiography of Socrates in Phd. 97b8–99b6,
in which the search for natural causes is exchanged
for the search for the good of processes.
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Socratic criticism of Stoic science.32
Interestingly, however, the condition to which Philo recalls the Chaldaeans is a Stoic
condition just as well as a Socratic one. As we saw above, the study of one’s own abode
is not just any part of Stoic oikeiôsis, but is its beginning. Philo, in other words, recalls
the Stoics to their own starting point, effectively urging them to travel in the oppo-
site direction from the direction their oikeiôsis has taken. For Philo, studying oneself is
a middle stage and constitutes progress with respect to the arrogant theorizing about
natural phenomena with which he associates the Stoics. The Stoics have mistaken the
route, however, treating the middle stage as the beginning of development and its initial
stages as its culmination. In this way, the metaphor of the journey helps Philo to criti-
cize the Stoic theory as leading people astray, away from the correct direction of human
development.
What is wrong then with the Stoic view? First, as mentioned earlier, Philo criticises
their epistemic optimism about discovering the causes of natural processes. All he thinks
they have are deceitful opinions. This emerges most clearly in 136, where he addresses
the Chaldaeans, and, via them, his readers:
Come forward now, you who are laden with vanity and gross stupidity and vast
pretence, you that are wise in your own conceit and not only declare (in every
case) that you perfectly know what each object is, but go so far as to venture in
your audacity to add the reasons for its being what it is[.]
In order to criticise the Stoics here, Philo can and does appeal to the whole spectrum of
Socratic language in its criticisms of sophistic and other false claims to knowledge. To be
fair, the Stoics did not claim that they were sages, as Philo was well aware. Nevertheless,
their philosophy is premissed on the strong possibility that the human mind can achieve
perfect knowledge of nature.
Second, the Stoics identify the cosmic order itself as the divine. In a passage in which
he explicitly identiﬁes the difference between the Chaldaeans and Moses, Philo presents
this deiﬁcation of the cosmos as a result of the Chaldaeans’ being impressed with the
harmony of the cosmos (179):
[T]hey have exhibited the universe as a perfect concord or symphony produced
by a sympathetic affinity between its parts, separated indeed in space, but house-
mates in kinship (sungeneiai de ou diôikismenôn). These men imagined that this
visible universe was the only thing in existence, either being itself God or con-
32 Philo’s charge that the Chaldaeans talk (hot) air
(aeromyteîte, 138) is a pun on Socrates’ rejection of
the Boreas myth; see note 22.
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taining God in itself as the soul of the whole. And they made Fate and Necessity
divine[.]
In the notion of sympathy (sumpatheia) and that of fate and necessity (heimarmenê, anagkê),
we recognise core Stoic notions. Philo goes on to note Moses’ agreement with the thought
that the cosmos is a sympathetic unity, as well as his disagreement with the idea that the
cosmos is the primary god (ho prôtos theos, 181). The bonds of the universe are not iden-
tical to god, but are his powers (dunameis): god is transcendent and prior to everything
that comes to be (183).
This fundamental disagreement about the nature of god goes beyond Philo’s criti-
cism of the theory of oikeiôsis, but also constitutes part of it. Stoic oikeiôsis ought to lead
to a rational being’s identiﬁcation with the divine rational order, to its knowledge of
the natural order and its self-perception as a part of this divine whole. In Philo’s view,
the end stage of oikeiôsis is both an instance of epistemic hybris and a fundamental mis-
conception of the nature of god and, therefore, of the ultimate end of humanity.
The metaphor of the journey and its different stages allows Philo to present this
disagreement as not just a matter of different views. As I suggested above, we are looking
at a process of self-awareness gone wrong, which has set its practitioners back. What the
Stoics consider progress is actually a regression. Much seems to depend, then, on the
way in which Philo’s middle stage plays out. What goes wrong when the Stoics conduct
self-study? How does Abraham, Philo’s rational soul, do better? We will now turn to
these questions.
5 Haran: studying one’s own home
Philo calls on the Stoics to leave behind natural philosophical speculation and to con-
centrate on the study of their own homes, just as Abraham lived in Haran after his
departure from Chaldaea. As we have seen, this is a recall to the beginnings of Stoic
oikeiôsis, a recall aimed at a better grasp of what one is.
The difference between Philo’s proposal and Stoic self-perception is not immedi-
ately evident, however. When we look closely at Philo’s descriptions of his middle stage
of self-knowledge, at ﬁrst sight it seems that the Stoics can agree with much of what he
says. Take, for instance, Philo’s exhortation in 137:
[T]ake knowledge of yourselves, and say clearly who you are, in body, in soul,
in sense-perception, in reason and speech, in each single one, even the most
minute, of the subdivisions of your being. Declare what sight is and how you
see, what hearing is and how you hear, what taste, touch, smelling are, and how
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you act in accordance with each of them, or what are the springs and sources
of these, from which is derived their very being.
The strong emphasis in this passage on the workings of the senses (which we also ﬁnd,
e.g., in 189) may differ from what the Stoics would emphasize in one’s self-perception,
but they would not disagree with it either. When Philo raises the question of the origin
of the senses, the Stoics can consider that to be a reference to the hêgemonikon, the leading
part of the soul from which the other parts – the senses, the faculty of speech, and the
power of reproduction – spring. At the beginning of De migratione, Philo himself seems
to cite this doctrine, when he speaks of the intellect “sowing in each of the parts of the
body the faculties that issue from itself” (3).33 What Philo writes about studying the
senses, then, is not problematic for a Stoic.
Similarly, there is agreement between the Stoics and Philo when the latter speaks
of the need to get to know what is good and bad in one’s own home. Studying one’s
own home in 195 involves “com[ing] to know, as the phrase of the poet puts it: ‘All that
exists of good and of ill in the halls of your homestead’”.34 There are differences between
Philo’s and the Stoics’ views on goods. The Stoics recognise only moral perfection and
actions in accordance with it as good, while Philo would consider other things to be
good as well. But these differences are hardly at stake here. The implicit contrast in
this passage, rather, is with what Philo has called the Chaldaeans’ conviction that good
and bad follow from stellar constellations. Here the Stoics can wholeheartedly agree:
goodness and evil must be sought in oneself, in one’s knowledge or ignorance. With
respect to this ethical aspect of self-knowledge, then, the Stoics can also go along with
Philo’s prescriptions.
In fact, the difference between Philo’s middle stage of self-knowledge and the self-
perception of Stoic oikeiôsis does not lie in the content of what is studied but in the di-
rection in which this study leads. For the Stoics, self-perception leads to an identiﬁcation
with human nature and action in accordance with one’s constitution. In a philosophi-
cally mature agent, this becomes an identiﬁcation with the order of the world. For Philo,
however, self-study should lead us to overcome the limits of oikeiôsis: The process is all
about distinguishing the higher from the lower elements in one’s constitution, in order
to identify with the higher elements and alienate oneself from the lower elements. The
natural condition of a human being ought not to be embraced, but to be left behind.
33 The Stoics would say hêgemonikon or dianoia rather
than nous, but the view is very similar. Note also that
with the exception of the generative part, all other
Stoic soul parts (the senses and speech) are cited
throughout this treatise as elements of one’s own
home, together with the body.
34 A reference to Od. 4.392, a very popular phrase
among philosophical writers. (Philo also cites it in
the similar context of Somn. 1.57.) This ethical as-
pect of self-knowledge is also emphatically present
in Migr. 219 and in 189.
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The alienating effect of self-study can be clearly observed when Philo mentions the
ruling structures in the soul. As we saw in 185, Philo’s Moses calls on the Chaldaeans to
come to know the master and the servant in themselves (and cf. 219). Now, the Stoics too
could speak of command in the soul, as is clear from their use of the term hêgemonikon
to refer to the highest aspect of the soul. Once more, therefore, it is not necessarily the
content of what is studied that makes the difference (although Philo perhaps makes a
stronger case than a Stoic would be comfortable with). It is rather what the study should
lead to (this passage continues the text from paragraph 7 cited above):
[L]et none of them [the body, senses, and speech] cling to you; rise superior to
them all; they are your subjects, never treat them as sovereign lords; you are a
king, school yourself once and for all to rule, not to be ruled; evermore be com-
ing to know yourself, … for in this way will you perceive those to whom it beﬁts
you to show obedience and those to whom it beﬁts you to give commands.35
Studying the senses and speech, and realising that they are by nature such as to be com-
manded rather than to be obeyed, here goes hand-in-hand with a separation from them.
It is instructive to see that cognitive and political verbs are put in coordinate position in
this passage: ‘rise superior’, ‘treat as subjects’, ‘school yourself’, ‘be coming to know’, and
‘perceive’. The cognitive verbs at the end are not intended to refer to a prior state, sub-
sequent to which you might undertake a mental withdrawal from what you have come
to know as subservient. The idea seems rather to be that the process is mutually rein-
forcing, and that a progressively better knowledge of yourself results from rising above
subservient elements.36 Moreover, the recognition of ruler and ruled involves identiﬁca-
tion with the one and alienation from the other. The verbs in this passage are not only
coordinate with each other but also with the verb that occurred just before: ‘alienate
yourself’. As you get to know yourself, then, you also come to identify with your ruling
element and to estrange yourself from whatever it is in yourself that does not rule.37
As in the ﬁrst stage of self-knowledge, Philo can draw on Platonic texts for this sec-
ond stage as well. He signals this in a different treatise (Somn. 1.58) by likening Socrates,
as the person who sought to know himself, to Terah, the father of Abraham who died
35 Migr. 7–8.
36 This does not prevent Philo from presenting the two
aspects as different phases in the journey elsewhere,
for instance in 189: “when you have surveyed all
your individual dwelling with absolute exactitude,
and have acquired an insight into the true nature of
each of its parts, bestir yourselves and seek for your
departure hence, for it is a call not to death but to
immortality.”
37 On the occurrence of gnôthi sauton in 8 and, partic-
ularly, the connection Philo makes between it and
the phrase proseche seautôi which occurs in the Septu-
agint, see Nazzaro 1970.
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in Haran.38 Particularly important, here, is the Alcibiades I.39 In this dialogue, Socrates
develops an argument for identifying with your soul rather than with your body. This
argument hinges on the issue of use and rulership. On the basis of analogies with crafts-
men like carpenters, Socrates argues that a human being is whatever it is that uses, not
only tools, but body parts like hands and indeed the whole body. It turns out that there
is no better candidate for this identiﬁcation than the soul: it uses and rules the body (Alc.
I 129b5–130c4). As in Philo, this Platonic text posits a strong discontinuity between soul
and body. It is Philo, however, who turns this into an anti-Stoic point and emphasizes
the need for alienation as a psychological process.
It is worth staying with the Alcibiades I for a moment because it contains a possible
model of reference for Philo’s connection between the second and third of his stages
of self-knowledge. The Socrates in this dialogue continues the philosophical search for
self-knowledge by asking how the soul may come to know itself. This is only possible
when it focuses on the wisdom in a soul (Socrates implies that one soul needs another
in order to understand itself). Moreover, since this wisdom and the divine are alike,
understanding oneself involves knowing the divine:
Can we mention anything about the soul which is more divine than that where
knowing and understanding are? – No, we can’t. – Then that region in it resem-
bles god, and someone who looked at that and grasped everything divine (pan
to theion), god and understanding, would in this way have the best grasp of
himself as well (houtô kai heauton an gnoiê malista).40
In the model described here, the wisdom present in a soul is similar to the divine. Its
similarity both allows you to come to know the divine and seems to be presented as a
reason why knowing the divine is necessary for knowing yourself. This last claim is prima
facie puzzling. Why should it be necessary to know something similar to you in order
to know yourself? We must note, however, that the question of self-knowledge in this
dialogue is driven by the desire for self-improvement. The most plausible explanation,
38 For discussion see Nazzaro 1969, 85–86; cf. Lévy
1992, 145–146.
39 In addition to the thematic connections, note that
logos ﬁgures in Alc. I 129b5–c6, one of the rare pas-
sages in the Platonic corpus that expressly distin-
guish the human being from the logos he uses.
Among verbal appropriations notice particularly
Migr. 195, where various elements from the Alc. I
are used: μαθὼν ἀκριβῶς ἑαυτὸν εἴσεται τάχα που
καὶ θεόν, οὐκέτι μένων ἐν Χαρράν, τοῖς αἰσθήσεως
ὀργάνοις, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστραφείς. Socrates
speaks of knowing oneself akribôs in implied ref-
erence to 132c–133c in 130c9; the aorists mirror
those of 133c4–6; the phrase tacha pou eisetai recalls
tach’ an gnoîmen/an tach’ heuroimen in 129a8–b2 (all
of these passages concern self-knowledge). The ar-
gument from Alc. I that the body is an instrument
for the soul was widely referred to by means of the
terminology of organa; its central teaching that one
needs to care for and know the soul was interpreted
as Socrates’ turning Alcibiades, and, by extension,
every one of us, towards himself (epistrophê, see Albi-
nus, Prol. 5.15–17; Procl. in Alc., passim).
40 Alc. I 133c1–6.
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therefore, is that the divine is the perfect example upon which the soul models itself. An
understanding of the divine will also give you an understanding of what you really are,
even if this is not yet what you are.
How does this Platonic dialogue help us understand the connection between the
second and third stages of self-knowledge in De migratione? We can appreciate that Philo
does not take himself to be saying something new when he connects self-knowledge to
knowledge of god. We should focus on what he says about this connection (and here
I anticipate what we will ﬁnd in the next section). Philo turns out to engage in some
implicit polemic with the Platonic tradition as well. As we shall see, he turns around
the order of knowledge suggested by Socrates. In the Alcibiades I, knowledge of god is
necessary in order to know yourself. Philo suggests that knowledge of yourself is the
basis from which to investigate god as well. The effect of this is that knowledge of god
comes to seem more and more difficult to reach. Although the Platonic dialogue does
seem tentative, to some extent, about this cognitive process (the wording “in this way
… the best”, in combination with the massive condition of having to know all of the
divine in order to know oneself), Philo’s epistemic caution is much more evident. The
difficulty of obtaining knowledge of god is increased by the difficulty of getting to know
yourself. Philo agrees with the suggestion in theAlcibiades I that self-knowledge can never
be completed. So much the more is it difficult to come to know god. It is time to see
how these ideas are developed in Philo’s text itself.
6 Beyond oikeiôsis
The process of identiﬁcation with whatever it is that rules in you can be extended, and
Philo does extend it, beyond the boundaries of oikeiôsis. In this ﬁnal section, we will
consider how he does so. We will also consider two alternative outcomes that Philo
seems to present for the process of self-study: analogy and ignorance. Once we consider
the way in which Philo presents these outcomes and the tension that exists between
them, we will see that his concern was not to describe a speciﬁc end point for the process
of self-knowledge, but to present it as an ongoing process. The metaphor of the journey
once more proves to be very apposite to what Philo wants to communicate.
Let us then consider the ways in which Philo extends the identiﬁcation of oneself
with the ruling element in oneself. There are three telling elements in the text. The ﬁrst
element is the way in which he continues after paragraphs 7–12. In these, as we saw, Philo
describes alienation from the body, the senses, and speech. In terms of the stages of the
journey, Abraham has already left or is leaving Haran, the place in which the soul studies
its own home. Nevertheless, paragraph 13 opens as follows: “So we ﬁnd that when the
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mind (nous) begins to know itself (arxêtai gnôrizein heauton) and to hold converse with the
things of the mind (noêta), it will thrust away from it that part of the soul which inclines
to the province of sense-perception”. We notice, again, the combination of getting to
know oneself and alienating oneself from the lower elements. The most striking thing
about this passage, however, and relevant to the point I am making, is that the mind
here is said to begin to know itself. Getting to know oneself has only just begun when
one has been studying the constitution of the body, the workings of the senses, and the
powers of speech. Even when the mind has moved beyond that and started to occupy
itself with intelligible objects of study, it is still said to be beginning to know itself.
A second, minor, textual element that points us to the incremental nature of self-
knowledge is the use of the word oikos. We saw above that Philo uses this word to indicate
the whole of the body, the senses, and speech in the contexts in which he speaks of the
need to get to know ‘your oikos’, but that he has a stricter use of the word oikos in the
opening paragraphs of the treatise (Migr. 2–12). We have now seen that, in terms of the
progress of Abraham’s journey, the opening paragraphs are posterior to many of the pas-
sages that speak of the need to study one’s own home. The latter are about the need to
go to or to dwell in Haran, whereas the beginning paragraphs are about one’s departure
from Haran. Against this background, Philo’s restriction of oikos to speech in 2–12 can
be interpreted as the result of self-study. The mind has progressively reﬁned its under-
standing of what counts as ‘itself’; just so, the word ‘home’ is also applied increasingly
articulately and strictly, no longer to refer indistinctly to the whole compound of body
and soul, but to speech as the immediate setting of the mind.41
Thirdly, Philo’s text also supports the interpretation of a continuous and progressive
process of self-knowledge by explicitly stating that when you obtain knowledge that
goes beyond knowledge of your human constitution, you are turning towards yourself
and obtaining knowledge of yourself. This comes out most clearly in paragraph 195,
when Philo recapitulates the three stages of self-knowledge. After he has introduced
the second as, “the [mind’s] consideration of itself”, he says that in the third stage the
mind “withdraw[s] into itself”.42 Key to understanding statements like this one is the
realisation that Philo does not mean to refer to a static entity when he speaks of knowing
‘oneself’. The reference of ‘oneself’ changes according to how far the mind has advanced
in the process. On all three counts, then, it seems that the language with which Philo
speaks of self-knowledge supports the idea that it is a continuous process.
41 Philo signals this aspect of restriction and articula-
tion by distinguishing oikos from oikia (3).
42 The aorist denotes temporal priority with respect
to knowing god (which Colson’s translation does
not bring out clearly), but what is termed ‘turning
towards oneself’ here is different from the study of
body, senses, and speech, from which I infer that it
also takes place after the departure from Haran (in
that sense Colson’s translation is justiﬁed).
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Regarding self-knowledge as a process may also help us with a radical tension in
Philo’s account between two outcomes of the study of oneself in Haran. There are pas-
sages in De migratione in which Philo sounds a very conﬁdent note about the results of
self-study. In 185, for instance, he writes that once you have distinguished the different
roles played by different elements in yourself – the master, the servant, that which has
soul and that which doesn’t, the rational and the irrational, and the immortal and the
mortal – you will “gain forthwith (euthus) a sure knowledge (epistême saphê) of god and
of his works”. This is because knowledge of yourself allows you to construct an analogy
(186):
Your reason will show you (logieisthe) that, as there is a mind (nous) in you, so
is there in the universe, and that as your mind has taken upon itself sovereign
control of all that is in you, and brought every part into subjection to itself, so
too He that is endued with lordship over all guides and controls the universe
by the law and right of an absolute sway.
In other words, study of yourself will allow you to realise that the structure of the cosmos
is similar to the structure of the human being; both have an intelligence that rules the
rest. Moses, who here addresses the Chaldaeans, seems to be extremely hopeful that this
will deliver “sure knowledge of god”.43
In other passages, however, Philo presents a very different picture of what results
from self-study. Consider what he says in 134:
What, then, is the end (telos) of right-mindedness (phronein orthôs)? To pronounce
on himself and all created being the verdict of folly (aphrosunê); for the ﬁnal aim
of knowledge (peras epistêmês) is to hold that we know nothing, he alone being
wise, who is also alone God.
This passage clearly states that the limit of human knowledge is the awareness of one’s
ignorance.
Let me brieﬂy digress to highlight the partially polemical aspect of this description
of the telos.44 Philo speaks about it in the course of his exegesis of Gen. 12.4 – his treat-
ment of Gen. 12.1–3 has taken up paragraphs 1–126 of the treatise, 127–175 are devoted
to Gen. 12.4. The Genesis account here starts speaking about Abraham’s response rather
than God’s promises: “and Abraham journeyed as the Lord had told him” (Migr. 127).
43 As Wolfson 1948, 2.78–80, points out, the letter of
this argument is congruent with Stoic arguments
for the existence of god; the difference is in the dis-
tance between the ruler and the ruled (cf. 80–81).
44 Note that Philo does not seem interested in select-
ing only one formula as his telos throughout his
works: many different descriptions can in fact be
found. For this see Besnier 1999; Runia 1986, 474–
475; Bonazzi 2008, 246–250; Dillon 2016, 116–119.
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Philo ﬁrst interprets this journeying in accordance with the Lord’s command as similar
to “the aim (telos) extolled by the best philosophers, to live agreeably to nature” (128).
In this description we recognise the Stoic end of life. This reference to the Stoic telos
prepares us for Philo’s own description of the telos, which he introduces in 134 (the pas-
sage cited above). To see to what extent Philo’s alternative description is polemical, let
us notice two things.45
First, Philo makes clear that he can agree with the Stoic telos to some extent. He
connects it to the slogan ‘to follow god’, which we know as a Pythagorean description of
the telos, and of which Philo says that this is the telos according to Moses (131). His alter-
native is, therefore, not a straightforward rejection of the formula as such. However, and
this is the second thing to notice, Philo rejects, as before, the epistemically overconﬁdent
attitude of the Stoics. Following god is not the acquisition of perfect knowledge about
nature, but the realisation that in comparison with god, human beings are ignorant.
Not incidentally the paragraph following 134 is one of the texts in which Philo calls the
Chaldaeans down from their heavenly studies to the investigation of themselves.
Again, then, Philo calls the Chaldaeans back from natural philosophy using a So-
cratic formula – that the limit of knowledge is awareness of our ignorance. How does
this square with the optimistic analogy that Moses proposed to the same Chaldaeans?
This is a tension that is not going to go away and that characterises Philo’s work else-
where too.46 The tension, however, can be mitigated.
After the introduction of the idea of coming to know god through analogy in 185,
this idea returns, but with greater caution and also with signiﬁcant changes to the con-
ception of god that is involved. In 192, Philo offers another explanation of how the
analogy works. After a withdrawal from what is mortal about yourself, “you will go on
to receive an education in your conceptions (doxas) regarding the Uncreate”. On the ba-
sis of the mind’s epistemic separability from the body, senses, and speech – its ability to
understand things without these three – Philo’s Moses argues that God must be onto-
logically separate from the world. Again, since the mind has not made the body, it can
be contained in it; therefore God, who has made the cosmos, cannot be contained in it.47
With the inference that God transcends the cosmos, these arguments lead to a stronger
conclusion than in 185, where ontological separation was not yet (explicitly) at stake.
With the stronger conclusion, however, the gap between the basis for the analogy (the
mind) and its inference (god) also becomes conspicuously wider. In the second passage
45 As the expression ‘the best philosophers’ shows,
Philo’s appreciation of Stoic philosophy is beyond
doubt; this makes the fundamental points of dis-
agreement with them all the more pressing in this
treatise.
46 It is expressed poignantly and indeed embraced in
Somn. 1.60. See Früchtel 1968, 147–163; cf. Runia
1986, 436–437.
47 On Philo’s view of creation see Runia 1986, esp.
438–446.
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in which the analogy recurs, 195, the epistemic conﬁdence in the analogy is very clearly
muted:
The third stage is when, having opened up the road that leads from oneself (aph’
hautou), in hope (elpisas) thereby to come to discern the Universal Father, so
hard to trace and unriddle, and having come to know itself accurately (mathôn
akribôs), it will perhaps (taxa) also know God.
Here the mind ‘hopes’ and will ‘perhaps’ know God. Finally, in the third passage in
which the analogy recurs, we ﬁnd a surprising absence of God. In 219–220, in the course
of interpreting what it means that Abraham “travelled through” (216) the land, Philo
exhorts the soul by means of an analogy between a human being and the cosmos, along
the microcosm – macrocosm model (219–220):48
Travel through (diodeuson) man also, if you will, o my soul, bringing to exami-
nation each component part of him. For instance … ﬁnd out what the body is
and what it must do or undergo to co-operate with the understanding [etc…].
[220] Travel again through the greatest and most perfect man (ton megiston kai
teleôtaton anthrôpon),49 this universe, and scan narrowly its parts, how far asun-
der they are in the positions which they occupy, how wholly made one by the
powers which govern them, and what constitutes for them all this invisible
bond of harmony and unity.
Here God has disappeared from view. The task of grasping him by means of analogy
has turned out to be increasingly difficult as the narrative progresses. The point Philo
is making is, again, directed against the Stoics. To see how, let us revisit 181, in which
Philo explains the disagreement between Moses and the Chaldaeans (whose position he
has described in 179, cited above on pages 122–123. The Chaldaeans thought that the
cosmos is God or contains God as its soul. Moses disagrees strongly: that which holds
the cosmos together is not God, but his invisible powers.50 To avoid misunderstanding,
Philo adds (182):
Wherefore, even though it be said somewhere in the Law-book: “God in heaven
above and on the earth below”, let no one suppose that He that is is spoken of
– since the existent Being can contain, but cannot be contained.
48 On this model in Philo see Borgen 1997, 218–219.
49 In Her. 155, Philo reports and ascribes to others
the view that the cosmos is a large human being;
this pair of human beings (micro- and macrocos-
mos) is distinct from the pair of ‘heavenly man’ and
‘earthly man’, the former of which is the intelligi-
ble paradigm after which the latter is created (for
discussion see Früchtel 1968, 29–36).
50 On the idea of the desmos (‘bond’) see Runia 1986,
238–241 (interpreting Tim. 41b1–6), 448–449 (iden-
tiﬁed with the logos).
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This distinction between God in his real being and his powers underlies 219–220 as well.
Though at ﬁrst sight the analogy seems to function on the same level as those in 185 and
192, a closer look reveals that a different item has inserted itself between the mind and
god to occupy the place of that to which the analogy leads: the cosmos, uniﬁed by the
powers of the God who himself remains out of reach for analogical reasoning.
It is striking that Philo now supports cosmological study, when he has called the
Chaldaeans down from it time and again. In narrative terms, the journey metaphor
and its three stages help keep Philo’s study of the cosmos separate from the Chaldaean
enterprise. Substantively, the crucial difference is that Abraham has come a long way. He
has taken a road on which he has learned to separate the mind and intelligible things
from what is below them. His journey has prepared him methodologically, so to speak,
for the proper study of the cosmos, since he will now not give in to the temptation to
identify the cosmos and god.
I spoke above of two outcomes of self-study and of the tension between them. Over
the course of his account, Philo nuances the epistemic optimism about analogical rea-
soning which he had Moses express in 185. Why then was Moses so optimistic? We might
think of this paragraph, the opening section of Moses’ address to the Chaldaeans, as tai-
lored to their wishes: their study is undertaken to discover the ﬁrst god, so Moses at ﬁrst
offers them hope of attaining such knowledge along his route. As we proceed in the trea-
tise, and as Philo comes to address his readers, or his soul, a much more careful account
comes to the fore, one which may not be as incompatible with the terminal ignorance
described in 134 as the optimistic account of 185.
With a clear grasp of God receding behind the horizon, the emphasis of Philo’s
account returns to where it was at the beginning: to the journey, the process of getting
to know yourself. In 7, Philo speaks of coming to know yourself all the time (panta ton
aiôna). In 219–220, it is through the verb diodeusai, ‘travel through’, that he expresses the
long duration of the process of coming to know oneself.51 In Philo’s reference to the
greatest man, even getting to know the cosmos is now conceptualized as part of self-
knowledge. In the few remaining paragraphs of the treatise after that, he comments on
the need to persist and not give up, even if matters are dark and difficult (dustheôrêton,
222). The soul never arrives in Philo’s treatise, it journeys on in a process of progressive
self-knowledge.
51 On this passage cf. Kotzia-Panteli 2002, 124–131,
who rightly stresses the protreptic character of this
text and argues that in 217–220 Philo uses Peri-
patetic material (Theophrastus, perhaps dialogues
by Aristotle). Cf. Abr. 65–66.
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7 Conclusion
The process of knowing oneself, as Philo envisages it, cannot be reduced to one epis-
temic state. It is a movement towards perfection that reaches beyond human nature.
The Stoics have been well aware of the moral need to move beyond the concerns for
one’s own organism. Their theory of oikeiôsis, in Philo’s view, is right to connect human
identity with the order of the whole cosmos. Nevertheless, the Stoics’ epistemic over-
reach blinds their view to the true, modest position of humankind. Had they stayed
longer in Haran, i.e., had they better grasped their own nature, they would not have de-
parted on the wrong footing and under false premises. They would have realised that the
correct analogy from the position of nous in human beings leads not to a divine world
soul but to positing a transcendent mind, a creator who is far superior to the cosmos.
Indeed, Philo seems to point to a common mistake underlying both the Stoics’ account
of self-awareness and their cosmo-theology. In both cases, they assume too much of a
continuity between the ruling mind and the elements over which it rules. In the initial
stages of oikeiôsis, this leads to an identiﬁcation with the body and the senses rather than
an alienation from them; in their account of the cosmos, it leads to a failure to posit a
radical break between the highest god and the cosmos which he has caused.
Philo employs Abraham’s journey of migration as a metaphor to describe the tra-
jectory of the soul. Its ﬁrst role is to indicate the errors of the Stoics. We ought to come
home, he urges, to come down from idle speculation, and to reside within ourselves.
This is the true place of oikeiôsis and the correct form of familiarization. The second role
of the journey metaphor is to emphasize the need to pass beyond Stoic oikeiôsis. Study of
our home should lead us to move away from it again, to become alienated with respect
to the body, senses, and speech, the things with which nature has endowed us. Our task
is to see the limits of our home and to leave it behind. The process to which we are
called, and this is the third role of the metaphor of the journey, is ongoing: in human
epistemic terms, we will never complete self-knowledge, nor will we be able to reach
beyond that to get to know the divine itself.52
52 It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the
important idea in Philo of God’s taking possession
of the wise person’s mind and of his gift of knowl-
edge (as expressed for instance in Her. 265: ἐξοικί-
ζεται μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ νοῦς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θείου
πνεύματος ἄφιξιν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μετανάστασιν αὐτοῦ
πάλιν εἰσοικίζεται). See Runia 1986, 437, for a suc-
cinct statement of the issue. According to Cazeaux
1965, 18, Migr. is composed to lead up to, without
ever mentioning, God’s revelation of himself as de-
scribed in Gen. 12.7; this may be (cf. Abr. 77–80).
Perhaps Philo hints at knowledge as a gift in Migr.
140 (just after the description of terminal ignorance,
the soul bears fruit, “it does not know how”) and 35
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